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Harm, Utility, and the Obligation to Obey the Law
BY RICHARD

DAGGER

(TEMPE/ARIZONA)

In a recent essay, "Political Obligation"1, R. M. Haré sets out a utilitarian
account of the obligation to obey the law which he believes to be immune to an
objection often brought against such accounts. In what follows I shall briefly
review this objection and Professor Hare's response to it; than I shall go on to
argue that Hare's response, ingenious as it is, fails to defeat the objection. Hare's

argument is instructive nonetheless, for its failure tells us something about wrongs
and harm as well as Utility and political obligation.
1.

In its simplest form, the objection to utilitarian accounts of the obligation to
obey the law with which Professor Haré is concerned consists in pointing out
that a conscientious utilitarian will break the law whenever he believes that he
can achieve better results by breaking it than by following it. Thus it might be
to borrow

argued,

from Hare,

an example

that

a poor

ought

person

to steal

from

a rieh one because, due to diminishing marginal Utility, this will produce a net
gain in utility. And this means that the principie of utility is incompatible with
an obligation to obey the law because the principie of utility counts for every
thing and the obligation to obey counts for nothing. On the utilitarian account,

in short,

there

is no obligation

to obey

the law.

When it is put this way, the objection is easily met by utilitarians. As Hare
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it and
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quite unlikely that breaking the law
growth of general mistrust" (p. 8)
will produce a net gain in utility.
As readers of David Lyons's Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism are aware,
however, this objection can be put in a form more diffïcultfor the utilitarian. For
if the utilitarian's appeal to side-effects meets the objection, the objector has
only to point to cases where the side-effects are either negligible or non-existent.

Such a situation arises when, in Hare's words, "one person can, by breaking a
law, secure for himself an advantage at the cost of no comparable disadvantage
to others, because he knows they are all going to keep the law, and it takes quite
a large number of breaches of it to produce any substantial disutility" (p. 9).
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This may happen, for instance, when a government responds to a fuel shortage
by ordering its Citizens to keep the températures in their homes at or below a
certain

level.

In

these

a utilitarian

circumstances

has

no need

to worry

about

the

side-effects of his law-breaking if he knows that his failure to comply will go
undetected and that it will make no real différence to the success or failure of
the conservation effort. The amount of fuel he consumes is an insignificant
portion of the total, after all, so his non-compliance will bring hardship to no
one; and if no one discovers his "free-riding", he will not be setting a bad
example

which

threatens

to undermine

the

government's

conservation

program.

The utilitarian may conclude, therefore, that his enjoyment of a more comfort
able température will actually maximize Utility because it is neither offset nor
outweighed by other considérations. Even when all things are considered, then,
the utilitarian in this and similar situations will decide that he ought to break the
law. This is to say, once again, that Utility counts for everything, obligation for
nothing. Thus utilitarianism fails to provide a satisfactory account of the obliga
tion to obey the law.
2.
response to this objection is to set out his own "universal
prescriptive" version of utilitarianism. Whenever we must decide what we ought
"
'What universal principie of
morally to do, Hare says, we must ask ourselves,

Professor Hare's

action can I accept for cases just like this, disregarding the fact that I occupy the
place in the situation that I do (i.e., giving no preferential weight to my own
interests just because they are mine?") (p. 3) This means that we must give
"equal weight to the equal interests" of everyone likely to be affected by our
actions, then devise and follow principies "which will in ail most promote those

interests"

(p.

3).

If we

follow

this

method,

according

to Hare,

we

are

led

to

a

form of utilitarianism, for the principies we prescribe must themselves be justi
fied by an appeal to their utility.
When the "universal-prescriptive" method is applied in the case of the utilitar
ian and the fuel shortage, furthermore, we find — or Professor Hare finds — that
the utilitarian must adopt a principie which requires him to comply with the

order to lower the température in his home. He must do so because his failure to
comply, even if it went unnoticed, would harm others by frustrating a desire
"which nearly ail of us have, namely the desire not to be taken advantage of,

even unknown to us" (p. 9). Since this desire is common, it appears that what
ever the utilitarian will gain by breaking this law will be outweighed by the harm
he does to others. What is true in this case will be true in others where the desire
not to be taken advantage of is involved, of course, and this leads Hare to
formúlate the following general reason for obeying the law: "The fact that, if I
break the law, I shall be taking advantage of those who keep it out of law

abidingness although they would like to do what it forbids, and thus harming
them by frustratingtheir desire not to be taken advantage of' (p. 11).
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3.
The problem with Hare's argument is that it rests on an unacceptably broad view
of what constitutes a harm. As he explains in another essay, "a man's interests
are harmed not only when his actual feeling-statesare adversely affected, but also
when desires which he has (for example, not to be cheated) are, even unknown
to him, frustrated"2. Now there is some truth to this, for it is certainly true that
we may be harmed without being (or even becoming) aware of it. This could

happen if a bank clerk were to divert funds from my account to his own, for
instance. Given the way I handle my account, I might never notice that, a bit at
a time, I had suffered a substantial loss. It is also true that we may be harmed
when others frustrate our desires, such as the desire to be free from assault. But
this is not to say, with Hare, that one is harmed whenever one's desires are

frustrated.
To see why this conception of harm is too broad, we need only think of cases
where A undeniably frustrâtesB's desires, but it would nevertheless seem odd, at
best, to say that B has been harmed by .4's action or inaction. Suppose that A is
an employer and that B applies for a position, one he very much wants, with A 's

firm. If A awards the position to someone eise, he has certainly frustrated B's
desire to hold the position; but unless there are special circumstances, we can
hardly say that A has harmed B. Or suppose that a pitcher in a baseball game

strikes out a batter, thereby frustratingthe batter's desire for a hit. Here again it
would be out of place to say that the pitcher has harmed the batter. Or suppose,
finally, that I insist that my daughter have soup, which she does not want, rather
than cookies, which she does, for lunch. I admittedly frustrate her desire for
cookies when I do this, but I do not believe that I harm her. Indeed, I should say

that I would corne closer to harming her were I to give in to her demand for
cookies. The point, however, is that in none of these cases, nor in a good many
others which we may easily imagine, does the frustration of desires constitute a
harm.

Hare's

conception

of

harm

is too

broad,

in sum,

because

Hare

does

not

recognize that one may be frustrated without being harmed. Once the con
scientious utilitarian notices this, he will reject Hare's general reason for obeying
the law.
Perhaps this is unfair to Professor Hare. Perhaps what he means is not that the
frustration of any desire whatsoever, but only the frustration of certain desires,
counts as harm. This seems to be unobjectionable. If these certain desires include
the desire not to be taken advantage of, furthermore, then Hare's general reason
for obeying the law will stand. But can he demónstrate that this desire is indeed

one of those whose frustration is harmful? Or, more generally, can Hare provide
a rule for distinguishing those desires which may be harmlessly frustrated from
those which may not?
There are, I think, two différent ways in which Hare might try to draw this
"The

in R. M. Hare, Essays
Argument from Received Opinion",
and Basingstoke:
Macmillan,
1971), p. 131.

(London

on Philosophical

Method
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distinction. The firstrelies upon what Joel Feinberg calis "the orthodox jurispru
dential analysis of harm as invaded interest"3. Following this conception of
harm, Hare might maintain that the frustration of desires is harmful whenever it
invades - or, more broadly, is contrary to - the interest of the person whose
desires are frustrated4. This in turn would enable Hare to dismiss some troubling
examples of the harmless frustration of desire. He might say, for instance, that I
may frustrate my daughter's desire for cookies without harming her because I
am acting in her interest, not invading or thwarting it, when I insist that she have
soup for lunch.
But what about the desire not to be taken advantage of or cheated? Are our
interests invaded when this particular desire is frustrated? To this there is no

ready answer; we must proceed case by case. If I were to lose money in a land
swindle, I should say that I was cheated, that my interests were invaded, ànd
that I was harmed. In other cases, though, including the kind of case which is
crucial to Hare's argument, invasion of interest does not follow from the frustra
tion of the desire not to be taken advantage of. This is demonstrated by further
of the fuel shortage example, where we are assuming that the
person who disobeys the conservation order escapes détection and deprives no
one of the benefits of the program. If there is any invasion of interest in this
case, it can only be because the person who disobeys is frustratingthe desire of
examination

those who, while complying with the program, do not want others to take
advantage of them. But does this really constitute an invasion of interest? It
hardly seems so. Those who are taken advantage of are not suffering a loss of
comfort or convenience or money or opportunity; and as long as they do not

discover that someone is taking advantage of them, they will not even suffer the
anguish or distress of knowing that one of their desires has been frustrated5. In
these circumstances the conscientious utilitarian may well decide that his failure
to

with

comply

the

conservation

order

will

not

only

produce

the

best

possible

— without
conséquences, but that it will do so without harming
invading the
interests of — anyone at all. Thus the "orthodox jurisprudential analysis of
harm" fails to support Hare,s claim that we are harmed whenever our desire not
to be taken advantage of is frustrated.

"Harm

and Self-Interest",

(Princeton:

Princeton

is harmed

when someone

Haré

himself

jurisprudentiai

defines
analysis

in Joel Feinberg,

University
invades

'harm'

Press,
(blocks

in a way

in his

Justice, and the Bounds
of Liberty
p. 45. Feinberg goes on to say, "A person
or thwarts) one of his interests".
Rights,

1980),

that is similar to, but perhaps broader than, the
and Harm", in Hare, Essays on the Moral

"Wrongness

(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 92-109.
Concepts
There (p. 97) he says, "To harm somebody
is to act against his interests".
For a similar argument aimed in a différent direction - against the principie of fair play
"
- see M. B. E. Smith, "Is There a Prima Facie
to Obey the Law?
in J.
Obligation
(Encino and Belmont, Ca.:
Feinberg and H. Gross, eds,, Law in PhilosophicalPerspective
Dickenson
the principie
disobedience

for
Co., 1977), p. 111. Smith's argument is actually misdirected,
Publishing
of fair play does not tie the obligation
to obey the law to the harm which
must necessarily produce.
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The second way in which Professor Hare might try to support a distinction
between desires which may be frustrated without harm and those which may not
is by appealing to a more explicitly ethical conception of harm. Some desires

may be rightfullyfrustrated, on this view, and others may not. This is to say that
one is harmed whenever one is injured — injured, that is, in the sense of treated
unjustly. This would allow Hare to handle the examples used against him earlier,
for he could say that as long as my daughter, the batter, and the job seeker are
not treated unjustly when their desires are frustrated, they are not being harmed.

This way of drawing the distinction would also allow him to say that the utilitar
ian in the fuel shortage example would be harming his countrymen if he were to
set his thermostat higher than the law allows because he would be doing injury,

or injustice, to them.
This second coñception of harm, however, is no more successful than the first
in providing Hare with the distinction he needs to save his utilitarian account of

the obligation to obey the law. There are at least two reasons for this, the first
being that the conception is simply unsatisfactory. It is not clear, that is, that
one is actually harmed whenever he is treated unjustly. If the utilitarian in the
fuel shortage example does set his thermostat at an illegally high level, he may
frustrate the desires of many people who do not want others to take advantage
of them; and if his failure to comply is discovered, he may well be accused of
acting unjustly. Yet it seems, again, that he has actually harmed no one. If harm
is mentioned at all in cases of this sort, it is not the "harm" of frustrating the
desire

not

to

be

taken

advantage

of,

or

even

the

"harm"

of

treating

others

unjustly, but the harm that may occur when others follow the law-breaker's
thereby

example,
But

let

us

undermining

grant,

for

the conservation

argument's

sake,

that

effort.
we

are

harmed

whenever

we

are

treated unjustly. If Hare were to adopt this conception of harm, he would still
face a second problem — a problem that is fatal to a utilitarian account of
political obligation. This is that any attempt to distinguish those desires which

may rightfully or justly be frustrated from those which may not must ultimately
rely on a notion of rightness or justice. Such a notion must either dépend upon
or be independent of the principie of utility. If it dépends upon the principie of
- if we
utility
say that an action is rightbecause it produces the best conséquen
ces possible in the circumstances - then we are stuck with a utilitarian account

of political obligation which remains open to the very objection which Hare is
seeking to defeat. For what are the conséquences of frustratingthe desires of
others when the others never know that their desires have been frustrated?
Given this utilitarian conception of harm, we should have to say, once more,
that the utilitarian in the fuel shortage example is acting rightly when he dis

obeys the order to conserve fuel. If something is harmful because it is unjust,
and if injustice is doing what is contrary to the principie of utility, then the
utilitarian does nothing harmful or unjust when he refuses to lower the setting of

his thermostat.

The alternative is to follow a conception of rightness or justice which is
independent of the principie of utility. But this would also be unsatisfactory,
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from Hare's point of view, because such a conception is incompatible with
utilitarianism. And as long as Hare cannot establish, on utilitarian grounds, that
the frustration of the desire not to be taken advantage of is harmful, then we
must conclude that his conception of harm is unacceptably broad and his ac
count of the obligation to obey the law unsatisfactory.
4.
There is at least one point on which Professor Hare and I agree, and that is
that those who break the law in situations such as the fuel shortage example
wrong those who comply with it. Our reasons for holding this view, however, are
quite différent. Hare believes that those who break the law in these circumstan

ces wrong those who abide by it because they harm them. I believe that the
law-breakers wrong the law-abiders despite the fact that they do not harm them.
- taken
advantage of,
My point, then, is simply that one may be wronged
- without
harmed6.
or
treated
unfairly
deceived, cheated,
being
unjustly
If his account of the obligation to obey the law is to be a utilitarian account,
Professor Hare must oblitérate this distinction. It is not enough to say that one

ought not to take advantage of others;/fore must show that one ought not to do
this because doing so would harm the others in some way. But he cannot do this,
as we have seen, without stretching the notion of harm farther than it will go.
Hare's account, consequently, is as open to the objection in question as any
other utilitarian account of the obligation to obey the law. For a more satisfac
tory account, we shall have to draw upon a moral theory which not only dis
tinguishes wrongs from harms, but also explains why one is wronged when he is
taken advantage of, deceived, or treated unfairly. Such a theory will rest on
rights and respect for persons, not Utility.

Résumé/Zusammenfassung
Le préjudice, l'utilité et l'obligation d'obéir à la loi: Dans un essai récent, R. M.
Hare donne un récit utilitaire de l'obligation d'obéir à la loi qu'il croit être à
l'abri d'une objection qu'on fait souvent à de tels essais. Dans le récit présent
cette objection et la réponse de Hare sont exposé brièvement. Ensuite l'auteur
prêtent que la réponse du Professeur Hare ne réussit pas à réfuter l'objection.
Cela est dû à la conception que Hare tient de la notion préjudice, qui est irrece
vablement large, parce qu'il ne distingue pas entre injustice et préjudice. Dans sa
that Jones, who is known widely as Smith's enemy, tells vicious lies about
Suppose
also that no one believes these lies and that
Smith in an attempt to ruin him. Suppose
Has he
actions.
Has Jones harmed Smith?
Smith never learns of Jones's slanderous
and "yes" to the second. I
I should answer "no" to the first question
wronged him?
that Jones has not
should also say that a moral theory which would lead us to conclude
wronged Smith unless he has harmed him is, at best, morally impoverished.
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conclusion l'auteur prétend qu'on trouve une explication convaincante de l'obli
gation d'obéir à la loi dans une théorie morale, qui dépend des droits et du res

pect pour les individus et non de l'utilité.

Schaden, Utilität und die Gehorsamspflicht gegenüber dem Recht: R. M. Hare
liefert in einem neueren Aufsatz eine utilitaristische Rechtfertigung der Gehor
samspflicht gegenüber dem Recht, die seiner Meinung nach gegen den Einwand

immun ist, der oftmals gegen Rechtfertigungen dieser Art vorgebracht wird. Im
vorliegenden Aufsatz werden dieser Einwand und Professor Hares Antwort
darauf kurz dargelegt; darauf aufbauend wird argumentiert, daß Hare s Antwort
diesen Einwand nicht widerlegt. Der Grund hierfür liegt in Hare s Begriff von
Schaden, der zu breit gefaßt ist, und er ist zu breit gefaßt, da er Schaden von
Unrecht nicht unterscheidet. Um eine zufriedenstellende Theorie der Gehorsams
pflicht gegenüber dem Recht zu erhalten, so schließt der Autor, müssen wir uns

einer Moraltheorie zuwenden, die auf Rechten und Menschenwürde und nicht
auf Utilität beruht.

